Listado de países que recibió dólares en forma de sobornos por Constructora Norberto Odebrecht
¿Qué países han recibido sobornos de Odebrecht?
Nueva York, Estados Unidos.- El Departamento de Justicia de Los Estados Unidos, y según una sentencia del juzgado del distrito Este de New York publicó un listado de Países que recibió dólares en forma de sobornos.
En diciembre de 2016, la constructora Odebrecht pagó una multa récord de 3.500 millones de dólares al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos y su director general, Marcelo Odebrecht, fue condenado a 19 años de cárcel en Brasil.
Descarga 29 paginas para descubrir que cantidades de dólares recibió cada país en forma de sobornos a altos funcionarios y empresarios.
Según un informe del Tribunal del Distrito de Los Estados Unidos:
TRIBUNAL DE DISTRITO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DISTRITO ESTE DE NUEVA YORK
ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA -
CONTRA LA EMPRESA ODEBRECHT S.A., Demandada.
LOS CARGOS DE ESTADOS UNIDOS: I N F O R M A T I O N Cr. No. 16-643 (RJD)
En todo momento relevante para esta Información, a menos que se indique lo contrario: T. La Ley de Prácticas Corruptas en el Extranjero
1. La Ley de Prácticas Corruptas en el Extranjero de 1977, según enmendada, Título 15, Código de los Estados Unidos, Secciones 78dd-1, et seq. (la "FCPA"), fue promulgada por el Congreso con el propósito, entre otras cosas, de hacer ilegal actuar de manera corrupta en cumplimiento de una oferta, promesa, autorización o pago de dinero o cualquier cosa de valor, directa o indirectamente, para un funcionario extranjero con el propósito de ayudar a obtener o retener negocios para, o dirigir negocios a, cualquier persona. Entidades e individuos relevantes.
2. La Demandada ODEBRECHT S.A. era un holding brasileño que, a través de varias entidades operativas (colectivamente "ODEBRECHT"), realizaba negocios en múltiples industrias, incluyendo ingeniería, construcción, infraestructura, energía, química, servicios públicos y bienes raíces. ODEBRECHT S.A. tenía su sede en Salvador, estado de Bahía, Brasil, y operaba en otros 27 países, incluido Estados Unidos.
4. Braskem S.A. ("Braskem"), una sociedade anontrna (corporación) constituida de conformidad con las leyes de Brasil y con sede en Sao Paulo, Brasil, era una de las empresas petroquímicas más grandes de América y producía una cartera de productos petroquímicos y termoplásticos. ODEBRECHT S.A. poseía el 50,1% de las acciones con derecho a voto y el 38,1% del capital social total de Brnskem y controlaba efectivamente la empresa. Petr61eo BrasileiroS.A. - Pet: Robras ("Petrobras"), la compañía petrolera nacional de Brasil, poseía el 36,1% de las acciones de Braskem. Las acciones depositarias estadounidenses de Braskem cotizaban en la Bolsa de Valores de Nueva York, y se requería que Braskem presentara reportes anuales ante la Comisión de Bolsa y Valores de los Estados Unidos (la "SEC") en virtud de la Sección 15 (d) de la Ley de Bolsa, Título 15, Estados Unidos. Código de los Estados, Sección 78o (d). Braskem era un "emisor" según se usa ese término en la FCPA, Título 15, Código de Estados Unidos, Secciones 78dd-1 (a) y 78m (b).
5. Smith & Nash Engineering Company ("S & N'1"), una empresa fantasma no afiliada con sede en las Islas Vírgenes Británicas, se estableció y administró bajo la dirección de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas. ODEBRECHT utilizó S&N para identificar el esquema de sobornos y ocultar y disfrazar pagos indebidos hechos a, y en beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros y partidos políticos extranjeros en varios países. S&N abrió al menos una cuenta bancaria (la "Cuenta S&N") en nombre de ODEBRECHT. ODEBRECHT transfirió dinero de varias cuentas bancarias, incluidas varias cuentas bancarias con sede en Nueva York (las "Cuentas con sede en Nueva York"), a la Cuenta S&N. Los fondos en la Cuenta S&N luego se utilizaron, en parte, para realizar pagos directos e indirectos de sobornos a funcionarios extranjeros. Un ciudadano de los Estados Unidos y residente de Nueva York y Florida fue el signatario autorizado de la Cuenta S&N.
6. Arcadex Corporation ("Arcadex") era una empresa fantasma no afiliada constituida en Belice. Arcadex fue establecido y administrado en la División de Operaciones Estructuradas, dirección y utilizada por ODEBRECHT para promover el esquema de sobornos y para ocultar y disfrazar pagos indebidos hechos a, y en beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros y empanadas políticas extranjeras en varios condados. Arcadex abrió al menos una cuenta bancaria en el extranjero (la "Cuenta Arcadex") en nombre deODEBRECHT. ODEBRECHT transfirió dinero de varias cuentas bancarias, incluidas las cuentas con sede en Nueva York, a la cuenta Arcadex. Los fondos de la Cuenta Arcadex se utilizaron luego, en parte, para realizar pagos de sobornos directos e indirectos a funcionarios extranjeros.
7. Golac Projects and Construction Corporation ("Golac") era una empresa fantasma no afiliada constituida en las Islas Vírgenes Británicas. Golac se estableció y administró bajo la dirección de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas y ODEBRECHT la utilizó para promover el esquema de sobornos y para ocultar y disfrazar los pagos efectuados a, y en beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros y partidos políticos extranjeros en varios países. Golac abrió al menos una cuenta bancaria en el extranjero (la "Cuenta Golac") en nombre de ODEBRECHT.ODEBRECHT transfirió dinero de varias cuentas bancarias, incluida la de Nueva York. Cuentas, a la cuenta Golac. Los fondos de la Cuenta Golac se utilizaron luego, en parte, para realizar pagos de sobornos directos e indirectos a funcionarios extranjeros.
8. "Empleado de Odebrecht I", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue funcionario y ejecutivo senior de ODEBRECHT SA en o aproximadamente y entre enero de 2009 y diciembre de 2015 y funcionario y ejecutivo senior de CNO en o aproximadamente y entre enero de 2002 y enero de 2010. El Empleado 1 de Odebrecht también fue director de Braskem en o aproximadamente y entre 2009 y diciembre de 2015.
9. "Empleado Odebrecht 2", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida en Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue ejecutivo senior de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas, en ot · about y entre 2006 y 2015, y reportó directamente al Empleado 1 de Odebrecht. 2 operaba la División de Operaciones Estructuradas para contabilizar y desembolsar pagos que no estaban incluidos en las finanzas declaradas públicamente por ODEBRECHT1, incluidos los pagos corruptos hechos a, o en beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros y partidos políticos extranjeros con el fin de obtener y retener negocios para ODEBRECHT.
I0. El "Empleado 3 de Odebrecht", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida en Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue ejecutivo de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas desde aproximadamente 2006 hasta 2015. Empleado de Odebrecht3 denunció al Empleado de Odebrecht2 y fue responsable de vigilar los pagos corruptos realizados en Brasil y en el exterior. En o alrededor de 2014 y 2015, mientras se encontraba en Miami, Florida, Odebrecht E1uployee 3 participó en una conducta delictiva para promover el esquema, incluidas reuniones con otros co-conspiradores para planificar acciones a tomar en relación con la División de Operaciones Estructuradas y el movimiento de procede criminal.
11. "Odebrecht Einp.Joyee 4", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, era el ejecutivo de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas a cargo de las operaciones financieras por pagos complejos y cuantiosos realizados por la División de Operaciones Estructuradas fuera de Brasil desde aproximadamente de 2006 a 2015. El Empleado 4 de Odebrecht también ayudó al Empleado 3 de Odebrecht a supervisar los pagos corruptos realizados por la División de Operaciones de Sti: ucturado en Brasil. En o alrededor de 2014 y 2015, mientras se encontraba en Miami, Florida, el Empleado 4 de Odebrecht realizó una conducta para promover el esquema, incluidas reuniones con otros co-conspiradores para planificar las acciones a tomar en relación con la División de Operaciones Estructuradas y el movimiento de producto delictivo,
12. "Empleado 5 de Odebrecht", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida por Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue un alto ejecutivo de CNO desde aproximadamente
1997 a 2007. A partir de entonces, aproximadamente de 2008 a 2010, el Empleado 5 de Odebrecht ocupó un cargo de oficial en CNO en el área de obras industriales, y en o alrededor de 2011 el Empleado 5 de Odebrecht se convirtió en Líder Corporativo de CNO. Permaneció en ese cargo hasta aproximadamente 2015. Como contacto principal entre ODEBRECHT y Petrobras entre aproximadamente 2004 y 2012, el Empleado 5 de Odebrecht supervisó la negociación y pago de sobornos por parte de funcionarios de ODEBRECHT a Pett · obras para obtener y mantener negocios con Petrobras.
13. El "Empleado 6 de Odebrecht", ciudadano de Brasil cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue un ejecutivo de alto nivel del área internacional de la división de ingeniería de ODEBRECHT desde aproximadamente el 2008 al 2015.
El Empleado 6 de Odebrecht reportaba al Empleado 1 de Odebrecht y era responsable de supervisar a los Superintendentes de Directores de ODEBRECHT, o líderes de país, de Angola y de varios países latinos.
Países americanos. Como parte de esa supervisión, el Empleado 6 de Odebrecht aprobó muchos de los pagos corruptos a funcionarios y partidos políticos extranjeros fuera de Brasil.
14. Petrobras era una empresa petrolera estatal brasileña y accionista minoritario en Braskem. Petrobras tenía su sede en Río de Janeiro, Brasil, y operaba para refinar, producir y distribuir petróleo, productos derivados del petróleo, gas, biocombustibles y energía. El gobierno brasileño poseía directamente aproximadamente el 50,3% de las acciones ordinarias de Petrobras con vofa1grights, mientras que un 10% adicional de las acciones de la corporación estaba controlado por el Banco de Desarrollo de Brasil y la Sovereign Wealth Ftmd de Brasil. Petrobras era una "agencia" e "instrumentalidad" de un gobierno extranjero, según se utilizan esos términos en la FCPA, Título 15, Código de los Estados Unidos, Secciones 78dd-1 (f) (l) y 78dd-3 (f) (2) (UN).
15. "Funcionario brasileño I", una persona cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue ejecutivo y director de Petrobras. Funcionario brasileño I era un "funcionario extranjero" en el sentido de la FCPA, Título 15. Estados Unidos Código, Sección 78dd-3 (t) (2) (A).
16. El "Oficial Brasileño 2", una persona cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y el ODEBRECHT, era ejecutivo y director de Petrobras. El funcionario brasileño2 era un "funcionario extranjero" en el sentido de la FCPA, Título 15, Código de los Estados Unidos, Sección 78dd 3 (f) (2) (A).
17. El "Oficial Brasileño 3", una persona cuya identidad es conocida por Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, era gerente de Petrobras. El funcionario brasileño 3 era un "funcionario extranjero" según el significado del FCP A, Título 15, Código de los Estados Unidos, Sección 78dd "3 (t) (2) (A).
18. "El funcionario brasileño 4", una persona cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, era un funcionario estatal electo de alto nivel en Brasil. El funcionario brasileño 4 era un "funcionario extranjero" en el sentido de la FCPA, Título 15 , Código de los Estados Unidos, Sección 78dd-3 (f) (2) (A).
19. "Funcionario brasileño 5", una persona cuya identidad es conocida por los Estados Unidos y ODEBRECHT, fue un funcionario de alto nivel en la rama legislativa del gobierno en Brasil. El funcionario brasileño 5 era un "funcionario extranjero" en el sentido de la FCPA, Título 15, Código de los Estados Unidos, Sección 78dd-3 (f) (2) (A).
Resumen del esquema de soborno
20. En o alrededor de y entre 2001 y 2016, ODEBRECHT, junto con sus co-conspiradores, conspiraron y acordaron a sabiendas y deliberadamente con otros para proporcionar corruptamente cientos de millones de dólares en pagos y otras cosas de valor para, y para el beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros, extranjeros. partidos políticos, funcionarios de partidos políticos extranjeros y candidatos políticos extranjeros para obtener una ventaja indebida e influir en esos funcionarios extranjeros, partidos políticos extranjeros y candidatos políticos extranjeros con el fin de obtener y retener negocios en varios países del mundo.
21. Durante el período de tiempo relevante, ODEBRECHT, junto con sus co-conspiradores, pagó aproximadamente $ 788 millones en sobornos en asociación con más de 100 proyectos en doce países, incluidos Angola, Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, República Dominicana, Ecuador, Guatemala, México. , Mozambique, Panamá, Perú y Venezuela.
22. Para confirmar el esquema de soborno criminal, ODEBRECHT y sus co-conspiradores crearon y financiaron una. estructura financiera elaborada y secreta que operaba a cuenta
para y desembolsar pagos de sobornos corruptos a, y en beneficio de, funcionarios extranjeros, partidos políticos extranjeros, funcionarios de partidos políticos extranjeros y candidatos políticos extranjeros. Con el tiempo, el desarrollo y la operación de esta estructura financiera secreta evolucionaron, y en o alrededor de 2006, ODEBRECHT estableció la División de Operaciones Estructuradas, una división independiente dentro de ODEBRECHT. La División de Operaciones Estructuradas funcionó efectivamente como un departamento de sobornos dentro de ODEBRECHT y sus entidades relacionadas. Para ocultar sus actividades, la División de Operaciones Estructuradas utilizó un sistema de comunicaciones completamente separado y fuera de los libros.
llamados "Drousys", que permitían a los miembros de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas comunicarse entre sí y con operadores financieros externos y otros co-conspiradores sobre los sobornos mediante el uso de correos electrónicos seguros y mensajes instantáneos, utilizando nombres en clave y contraseñas.
23. ODEBRECHT y sus empleados y agentes tomaron una serie de medidas mientras se encontraban en el territorio de los Estados Unidos para promover el plan corrupto. Por ejemplo, se establecieron algunas de las entidades extraterritoriales utilizadas por la División de Operaciones Estructuradas para retener y desembolsar fondos no registrados. propiedad de y / u operado por personas ubicadas en los Estados Unidos. Además, en ocasiones durante la conspiración, personas que trabajaban en la División de Operaciones Estructuradas, incluido el Empleado 3 de Odebrecht, el Empleado 4 de Odebrecht y otros, tomaron medidas para promover el esquema de soborno mientras se encontraban en los Estados Unidos. Por ejemplo, en o alrededor del 20 l4 y 2015, mientras se encontraban en Miami, Florida, el Empleado 3 de Odebrecht y el Empleado 4 de Odebrecht participaron en conductas relacionadas con ciertos proyectos para promover el esquema, incluyendo reuniones con otros co-conspiradores para planificar acciones tomado en conexión con la
División de Operaciones Estructuradas, el movimiento de productos delictivos y otras conductas delictivas.
24. En total, ODEBRECHT, junto con sus co-conspiradores, pagó más de $ 788 millones en sobornos para asegurar ilegalmente proyectos en múltiples países, incluidos, como se describe a continuación, pagos corruptos a empleados y ejecutivos de Petrobras; pagos corruptos a otros funcionarios gubernamentales en Brasil; y pagos corruptos a funcionarios extranjeros en otros once países, con beneficios mal habidos para ODEBRECHT y sus co-conspiradores de aproximadamente $ 3.336 mil millones.
En esta Información, los "beneficios" se refieren a las ganancias obtenidas en un proyecto particular para el cual las ganancias se generaron como resultado de un pago de soborno. Para proyectos que generaron ganancias para ODEBRECHT que fueron menores que el monto del pago de soborno asociado, el monto del pago de soborno se utilizó para calcular el beneficio. IV. La División de operaciones estructuradas y la forma y los medios de la conspiración.
25. La División de Operaciones Estructuradas fue liderada por el Empleado 2 de Odebrecht y atendida por otros empleados y / o agentes de ODEBRECHT (incluido el Empleado Odebrecht 3 y el Empleado Odebrecht 4) que trabajaban con una serie de operadores financieros o doleiros (también conocidos como comerciantes de dinero, funcionaba para cambiar reales brasileños por dólares estadounidenses). El Empleado 2 de Odebrecht reportó al Empleado J de Odebrecht, quien estuvo a cargo de aprobar los pagos corruptos realizados por la División de Operaciones Estructuradas hasta aproximadamente 2009, y quien, posteriormente, recibió actualizaciones de los pagos realizados por la División de Operaciones Estructuradas. Aproximadamente a partir de 2009, el Empleado de Odebrecht l delegó la responsabilidad de aprobar los pagos de la CMRNPL a los líderes empresariales de Brasil y a los líderes de los distintos países de las demás jurisdicciones.
Continua en ingles:
26. The Division of Structured Operations managed its "shadow" budget via two computer systems: (i) the "MyWebDay'' system, which was used for making payment tequests, processing payments, and generating and populating spreadsheets that tracked andinternally accounted for the shadow budget; and (ii) the "Drousys" system, which allowed members ofthe Division of Structured Operations to communicate with one another and with outside financial operators and other co-conspirators using secure emails and instant messages.
To conceal their corrupt activities, users ofthe Drousys system utilized a series ofcodenames tomask their identities, and referred to bribe recipients and intermediaries using additional codes and passwords.
27. To further conceal ODEBRECHT's criminal conduct, the Division ofStructured Operations managed and distTibuted funds that ODEBRECHT never recorded on itsbalance sheet. These ''lmrecorded funds" were generated by ODEBRECHT through a variety ofmethods, including but not limited to: (i) standing overhead charges collected from subsidiaries;(ii) overcharges and fees that were attributed as legitimate to service providers and subcontractors but not included in project budgets; (iii) undeclared retainers and success fees forthe purchase of company assets; and (iv) self-insurance and self-guarantee transactions.
28. Once generated, w1recorded funds were funneled by the Division ofStructured Operations to a series of offshore entities that were not included on ODEBRECHT's balance sheet as related entities. These entities were established and managed at the Division ofStructured Operations' direction by beneficial owners who were compensated for opening and,in some cases, operating these entities. ODEBRECHT used these offshore entities to further the bribery scheme, and to conceal and disguise improper payments made to, or for the benefit of,
JO foreign officials, foreign political parties, foreign political party officials and foreign political candidates in various countries. Many ofthe transactions were layered through multiple levelsofoffshore entities and bank accounts throughout the world, often transferring the illicit fundsthrough up to four levels of offshore bank accotmts before reaching the final recipient. In thisregard, members ofthe conspiracy sought to distance the origin ofthe funds from the final beneficiaries.
29, The funds were disbursed from the offshore entities at the Division of Structmed Operations' direction. These disbursements were made by financial operators who acted on ODEBRECHT's behalf, including but not limited to the beneficial owners of theaccow1ts and doleiros, who delivered the payments in cash both inside and outside Brazil inpackages or suitcases at locations predetermined by the beneficiary ofthe funds; or made the payments via wire transfer tlU'ough one or more ofthe offshore entities.
30. 1nfl.utherance ofthe bribery scheme and to facilitate the movement of illicit funds, ODEBRECHT and its co-conspirators also utilized banks with distinct features thatwould aid in the scheme: specifically, smaller banks located in countries with strict lawsregarding the protection of bank secrecy and the sharing of information with international law enforcement. To ensure the cooperation ofthese favored banks, ODEBRECHT and its co conspirators frequently paid remuneration fees and higher rates to the banking institutions, and a percentageofeachillicittransactiontocertaincomplicitbankexecutives. TheDivisionof Structured Operations counted on the collusion ofthe favored banks and their executives toconduct the tt·ansfers between accounts, largely relying on the use of fictitious contracts to backstop the transactions and bypass compliance inquiries. Ce11ain co-conspirators, such as 11 Odebrecht Employee 4, visited the countries where the final beneficiaries were located andbrought them to the favored banks to open accounts to facilitate the illicit payment transfers.
31. After a particular favored bank located in Antigua began to falter, members ofthe conspiracy, including former executives with the faltering bank, purchased theAntiguan branch of an Austrian bank in or about 2010 or 201 I. By virtue of this acquisition, other members of the conspfracy, including senior politicians from multiple countries receivingbribe payments, could open bank accounts and receive transfers without the risk ofraising attention. By acquiring the bank, members ofthe conspiracy, including Odebrecht Employee 4andothers,wiUfullyfacilitatedtheillegalpaymentscheme. Theyalsoactivelyparticipatedinobtaining fictitious contracts to suppmtthe operations ofthe DivisionofStructured Operationsand responded directly to compliance issues in order to allow operations to be attthorized.
32. ODEBRECHT caused wfre transfers to be made to these and other bankaccounts created by these offshore entities from ODEBRECHT-related bank accounts, including from severalNew York-based Accounts held by CNO.V. Corrupt Payments to Government Officials in Brazil
33. Beginning in at least as early as 2003 and continuing throughapproximately 2016, ODEBRECHT caused approximately $349 million in corrupt bribe payments to be made to political patties, foreign officials, and their representatives, in Brazil, inorder to secure an improper advantage to obtain and retain business for ODEBRECHT.ODEBRECHT benefited mot'e than$] .9 billion as a result of these corrupt payments.
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A. Corrupt Payments to Obtain and Retain Business with Petrobras34. Beginning in or about 2004 and continuing through at least 2012,
ODEBRECHT agreed to make, and caused to be made, corrupt payments to, and for the benefitof, foreign officials, including Brazilian politicians and Petrobras executives and employees, inorder to secure contracts with Petrobras.
3 5 . A s p a t t o f t h e s c h e m e , O D E B R E C H T p a 1t i c i p a t e d i n a s e r i e s o f m e e t i n g s with other construction companies to evaluate and divide up future contracts for Petrobrasprojects among the companies (together, the "Cartel Companies"). Once it was determinedwhich company or companies should be responsible for a certain project, as well as the price thatPetrobras felt was appropriate for the particular project, it was agreed that only the predete1mined company would present a qualifying bid, and that the other Cartel Companies would present proposals that would ensme the predete1mined company's wi1ming bid. In thismanner, the Cartel Companies rotated the available Petrobras contracts between them.
36. Ceitain executives of Petrobras involved in awarding the projects onbehalfofPetrobras were aware ofthe Cartel Companies' bid rigging, and in orderto guaranteethe continued success of the bid rigging scheme and to secure the contracts with Petrobras,ODEBRECHT and the other Caitel Companies agreed to make corrupt payments to, and for the benefit of, these Petrobrns executives, other Brazilian politicians and political parties.
37. For example, in or about October 20 I0, ODEBRECHT bid for and won aPetrobras contract for the provisioh ofvarious environmental and security certification setvicesthatwerenecessaryforvariousactivitiesthatPetrobrasunde1tookabroad. lnordertowinthecontract, ODEBRECHT agreed to pay bribes that would be forwarded to Brazilian political 13 parties. OdebrechtEmployee 5 metwith certain ofthe Cartel Companies, all ofwhich agreed that ODEB.RECHT would get the contract; two ofthe Cartel Companies also agreed to provide proposals in such a way that would ensure that ODEBRECHT would win the bid.ODEBRECHT directed more than $40 million to ce1tain Brazilian political paities from its Division of Structured Operations using unrecorded funds in connection with the project; andce1tain of the funds were paid directly to specific goverrunent officials.
38. ODEBRECHT caused numerous illicit payments to be made from UnitedStates-based bank accounts to perpetuate its bribe scheme in Brazil. For example, between atleast December 2006 and December 2007, ODEBRECHT caused transfers totaling almost $40millionto be made frotn the New York-based Accounts to the S&N Account. Thereafter, in orbetween January and August 2011, ODEBRECHT used the S&N AccoL1nt to make bribepayments, including paying approximately $3.5 million and almost 2 million Swiss Francs to thebank account of an offshore entity controlled by Brazilian Official 1, then an executive atPetrobras.
39. Similarly, in or about December 2009, ODEBRECHT caused transferstotaling approximately $20 million to be made from the New York-based Accounts to theArcadex AccOLmt. Before and contemporaneously with the trnnsfers from the New York-based Accounts, ODEBRECHT caused numerous money transfers to be made from the Arcadex Account to a second Arcadex account (the "Second Arcadex Account'') that was used to make bribe payments, including an approximately $430,000 bribe payment to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 2, then an executive at Petrobras.
40. Furthermore, in or about December 2008, ODEBRECHT caused transfers totaling almost $48 million to be made from the New York-based Accounts to the Golac AccOLmt. Thereafter,inotaboutandbetweenDecember2008andJuly2010,ODEBRECHTcaused transfers from the Golac Account to three unrelated accounts in Panama and Antigua from which approximately $10 million was transferred to the accounts of three then-Petrobras executives Brnzilian Official 1, Brazilian Official 2 and Brazilian Official 3.
B. Corrupt Payments to Obtain and Retain Other Business in Brazil41. ln addition to the corrupt payments to secure contracts wW1. Petrobras, ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made corrupt payments to political parties, individual
candidates and other government officials at the local, regional and national level in Brazil with unrecorded funds from the Division of Structured Operations in order to obtain and retain other business in Brazil.
42. For example, ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made coi:rupt payments to Brazilian officials with unrecorded funds in order to secure a transp01tation project in Brazil. ODEBRECHT was not prut ofthe original group of companies awarded the project,but ultimately purchased the rights to participate in the project. Subsequently, ODEBRECHT agreed to make payments to Brazilian Official 4, a high-level state elected official in Brazil, inexchange for Brazilian O:ffidal 4's assistance in enstu'ing ODEBRECHT's continued work on the project. Between approximately 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT, through the Division of Structured Operations, made payments in Brazilian Reais (totaling more than $20 million) to Brazilian Offilcial 4 and other foreign officials in connection with the project. ODEBRECHTprofited approximately $184 million from the project.
43. Similarly, in or about 2011, Brazilian Official 5, a high-level officialwithin the legislative branch of government in Brazil, requested that ODEBRECHT make payments to a political party in exchange for the pa1ty's influence to continue a constructionproject in Rio de Janeiro from which ODEBRECHT stood to benefit. In or about and between2011 and 2014, ODEBRECHT, through the Division ofStructured Operations, made payments in Brazilian Reais (totaling approximately $9.7 million) to Brazilian Official 5,_ as did othercompanies involved in the project, in order to ensure future contributions to the project fromcertain government groups. ODEBRECHT profited approximately $142 million from theproject.
VI. Corrupt Payments to Foreign Officials and Political Parties in Other Countries
44. In or about and between 2001 and 2016, ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made approximately $439 million in corrupt payments to foreign political patties) foreignofficials, and their representatives, in countries outside of Brazil, including Angola, Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, Peruand Venezuela, in order to secure an improper advantage to obtain and retain business forODEBRECHTinthosecountries. ODEBRECHTbenefitedmorethan$1.4billionasaresultofthese corrupt payments.
45. ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made the majority ofthese corruptpayments to government officials; third parties associated with, and for the benefit of, government officials; and political parties or campaigns. All ofthe corrupt payments were madeto secme an improper advantage for ODEBRECHT to obtain and retain busjness. Typically, theDivision of Structured Operations executed the corrupt payments using unrecorded funds, either
(i) jn cash jn the country in question, or (ii) by deposits into accounts indicated by the ultimate beneficiaries or their intermediaries.
46. In or about and between 2008 and 2015, ODEBRECHT's corporate structme in Latin America was organized such that the senior-most country leaders reported to Odebrecht Employee 6, who was the.Business Leader for Angola (until July 2012, at which time,due to a restructuring, Odebrecht Employee 6 no longer had oversight io Angola) and the above referenced countries in Latin America, except Venezuela.
A. Angola
47. fn or about and between 2006 and 2013, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $50 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Angola in order to secure public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits of approximately $261.7million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
48. for example, beginning in or about 2006, Odebrecht Employee 6 causedODEBRECHT to make approximately $8 million in corrupt payments to an Angolan government official to obtain infrastructure projects in Angola. ODEBRECHT also paid another approximately $1.19 million to a high-level official ofan Angolan state-owned and state controlled company to obtain business. The bribe payments were generally made with unrecorded funds and coordinated through the Division of Stn1ctured Operations.
B. Argentina
49. In or about and between 2007 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $35 million in corrupt payments to intermediaries with the understandingthat these payments would be passed, in part, to government officials in Argentina. The corrupt payments were made in association with at least three infrastrncture projects, and ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofapproximately $278 million.
50. For example, in 2008, prior to a bid on government projects beingfinalized, ODEBRECHT agreed that, in order to secure the contracts, ODEBRECHT and otherswould commit to making a future payment to undisclosed government officials in Argentina inan unspecified amount. In or about and between 2011 and 2014, ODEBRECHT, through theDivision of Structured Operations, made payments totaling approximately $2.9 million to an intermediary with the understanding that the intermediary would pass the payments toArgentinian government officials.
5 I. Thereafter, in or about and between January 2011 and March 20 I4,ODEBRECHT made additional corrupt payments through the Division of Structured Operations totaling approximately $500,000 to private accounts at the direction of an intermediary, with theunderstanding that the payments were for the benefit ofArgentinian government officials.
C. Colombia
52. In or about and between 2009 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $11 million in corrupt payments in Colombia in order to secUJ·e public workscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$50millionasaresultofthese corrupt payments.
53. For example, in or about and between 2009 and 2010, ODEBRECHTagreed to pay, and later paid through the Division of Structured Operations with OdebrechtEmployee 61 s authorization, a $6.5 million bribe to a government official in charge o f awarding a construction project with the Colombian government in exchange for assistance with winning the project.
D. The Dominican Republic54. fn or about and between 200 I and 20 I 4, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $92 million in corrupt payments to government officials and intermediariesworkingontheirbehalfintheDominicanRepublic. ODEBRECHTrealized benefits of more than $163 million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
Dominican Republic
55. For example, in order to secure certain public works contracts in theDominican Republic, ODE.BRECHT paid bribes to an intermediary responsible for interfacingwith the govenunent with the understanding that the inte11nediary would pass the money, in part,to government officials. Most ofthe payments were made with unrecorded funds from theDivision of Structured Operations with the authorization of Odebrecht Employee 6. Through this agreement, ODEBRECHT was able to influence governmental budget and financing approvals for ce1tain projects in the Dominican Republic.
En español
República Dominicana
55. Por ejemplo, para asegurar ciertos contratos de obras públicas en la República Dominicana, ODE.BRECHT pagó sobornos a un intermediario responsable de interactuar con el gobierno en el entendimiento de que el intermediario pasaría el dinero, en parte, a funcionarios del gobierno. La mayoría de los pagos se realizaron con fondos no registrados de la División de Operaciones Estructuradas con autorización del Empleado 6 de Odebrecht. A través de este convenio, ODEBRECHT pudo influir en las aprobaciones presupuestarias y financieras gubernamentales para algunos proyectos en República Dominicana.
E. Ecuador
56. In or about and between 2007 and 2016, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $33.5 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Ecuador. ODEBRECHT realized benefits of more than $116 million as a result of these corrupt payments.
57. For example, in or about and between 2007 and 2008, ODEBRECHT experienceda nwnber of problems related to a construction contract, and agreed with an intermediary to an Ecuadorian government official with control over public contracts to make corn.1pt payments to the govermuent official to solve the problems. ODEBRECHT later delivered these payments in cash to the government official.
F. Guatemala
58. In or about and between 2013 and 2015, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $18 million in co1rnpt payments to government officials in Guatemalainordertosecurepublicworkscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$34million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
59. For example, in relation to an infrastructut'e project awatded to ODEBRECHT, the company agreed to pay a high-ranking Guatemalan government official apercentage of the value ofthe contract over the life ofthe project in exchange for the official assisting ODEB.RECHT with obtajning payments under the contract. ODEBRECHT madeapproximately $11.5 million in corrupt payments, through the Division of Structured Operationsand with Odebrecht Employee 6's approval, to companies designated by the Guatemalan official.
G. Mexico
60. In or about and between 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $10.5 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Mexico in order to secut'e public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofmore than $39mj[Jion as a t'esult o f these corrupt payments.
61. For example, in or about October 2013, ODEBRECHT agreed to pay a bribe to a high-level official ofa Mexican state-owned and state-controlled company in exchange fortheofficialassistingODEBRECHTwithwinningaproject. Inoraboutandbetween
December 2013 and late 2014, ODEBRECHT, through the Divjsion of Structw·ed Operations,paid the official $6 mWion.
H. Mozambique62. In or about and between 201 I and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $900,000 in corrupt payments to government officials inMozambique.
63. The corrupt payments included approximately $250,000 in payments to ahigh-level government official in Mozambique in exchange for ODEBRECHT obtaining favorable te1ms on a government construction project, which the government had not beeninclined to accept before ODEBRECHT offered to make the corrupt payment. ODEBRECHT made these payments in installments of$135,000 and $115,000 with the Division of StructuredOperations' unrecorded funds from an offshore company.
I. Panama64. In or about and between 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $59 million in corrupt payments to government officials and intermediaries working on their behalf ih Panama in order to secure, among other things, publicworkscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$175millionasaresultofthese corrupt payments.
65. For example, in or about and between 2009 and 2012, ODEBRECHTagreed to pay $6 miJlion to two close relatives ofa high-level Panamanian government official inconnection with government infrastructLu-e projects, with the understanding that, in exchange for the payments, the government official would ensure ODEBRECHT's participation in and paymentunderthecontracts. 1nordertoeffectuatethecon:uptpayments,ODEBRECHTutilized the Division of Structmed Operations to make payments in umecorde<l funds to offshore companies designated by the Panamanian government official and intermediaries.
J. Peru
66. In or about and between 2005 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $29 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Pe1:u in order to secure public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofmore than $143million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
67. For example, in or about 2005, ODEBRECHT participated in a tender fora government infrastructure project. During the tender process, an ODEBRECHT employee wasapproached by an intermediary ofa high-level official in the Peruvian government, who offered to suppo,t ODEBRECHT's bid, if, in the event that ODEBRECHT was awarded the project, it would make corrupt payments benefiting the government official. The payments were agreed to be paid through companies owned by an intennediary who had a relationship with the government official. After the initial conversations with the intermediary, the ODEBRECHTemployee pa1ticipated in several meetings, some of which were attended by the governmentofficial. ODEBRECHT won the tender and made co1rnpt payments totaling approximately $20 miUion from approximately 2005 to 2008 to specific companies, as directed by the intermediary,with unrecorded funds from the Division of Structured Operations.
68. Fwihermore, in or about 2008, ODEBRECHT bid on a government transportation contract in Peru. In order to influence the bid committee to help ODEBRECHTsecure the contract, ODEBRECHT agteed to pay $1.4 million to a high-level official in the
Peruvian government and members ofthe tender committee for the project. In or about 2009,ODEBRECHT won the contract, valued at approximately $400 million. ODEBRECHT made the corrupt payments, which were approved by Odebrecht Employee 6, with unrecorded fuhdsfrom the Division of Structured Operations.
K. V enezuela69. In or about and between 2006 and 2015, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $98 million in corrupt payments to government officials and intermediaries working on their behalf in Venezuela in order to obtain and retain public works contracts.
70. ODEBRECHT typically used intermediaries to negotiate contracts withgovernment officials on behalf of the company. ODEBRECHT understood that theseintermediaries would pay bribes to government officials on behalfofthe company in order to influence the allocation of resources to ODEBRECHT projects, to obtain confidential pricingand bidding information in connection with those projects, and to obtain and retain contracts for those projects. Generally, these intennediaries charged a percentage ofthe contract price inconnection with their work on behalf of ODEBRECHT.
71. For example, ODEBRECHT paid an intermediary to help it obtain contracts with a Venezuelan state-owned and state-controlled company. During the negotiations;the intermediaiy made it clear that the money would be used to pay a bribe in exchange for obtaining cettain service agreements and amendments, and that the intermediary represented various directors ofthe state-owned and state-controlled company. ODEBRECHT paid the intermediary approximately $39 million.
VII. Obstruction of Justice72. ln or about 2014, Brazilian law enforcement authorities began an initially
covert investigation into corrnption related to Petrobras, called Lavo Jato ot' "OperationCarwash." Thereafter, related investigations were launched in the United States and Switzerland. After ODEBRECHT became aware of Lavo Jato and related investigations, cetiainindividuals - including Odebrecht Employee 1 and employees and executives involved in theDivision of Strucl:tn'ed Operations - took steps to conceal or destroy evidence of criminal activities, and to hinder the various investigations. These steps included, but were not limited to,a directive from Odebrecht Employee 1 to ODEBRECHT employees to delete records that mightreveal illegal activities.
73. Furthermore, in or about mid-2015, Odebrecht Employee 4 attended ameeting in Miami, Florida, with a consular official from Antigua and an intermediary to a highlevel government official in Antigua. In order to conceal ODEBRECHT's corrupt activities,Odebrecht Employee 4 requested that the high-level official refrain from providing to international authorities various banking documents that would reveal illicit payments made bythe Division of StructUl'ed Operations on behalf of ODEBRECHT, and agreed to pay $4 million to the high-level official to refrain from sending the documents. Odebrecht Employee 3 made three payments of 1 million Euros on behalf of0DEBRECHT in ordet- to secure the deal. Thecontemplated fourth payment was never made.
74. Fmthermore, in or about January 2016, after Lavo Jato and theinvestigations by United States and Swiss authorities were well-known to ODEBRECHT;employees and/or agents of ODEBRECHT intentionally caused the destruction of phys.ical encryption keys needed to access the MyWebDay system, which contained evidence relating tothe bribery scheme. As a result ofthese actions, significant evidence from the MyWebDaysystem was rendered inaccessible.
CONSPIRACY TO BRIBE FOREIGN OFFICIALS
75. The allegations contained in paragraphs one through 74 are realleged and
ittcorporated as though fully set fo1th in this paragraph.76. In or about and between 2001 and 2016, both dates being approximate and
inclusive, within the Eastern District ofNew Y ork and elsewhere, the defendant ODEBRECHTS.A., together with others, did knowingly and willfully conspire to commit offenses against the United States, to wit: as a person other than an issuer or domestic concern, through its employeesand agents, while in the territory ofthe United States, did corruptly commit acts in furtherance ofan offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment ofany money, offer, gift,promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value to a foreign official, a foreign political party, a foreign political party official, a foreign political candidate and to a person, while knowing that all or a po1tion ofsuch money and thing ofvalue would be and had been offered, given, and promised to a foreign official, a foreign political pruty, a foreignpolitical party official and a foreign political candidate for purposes of: (a) influencing acts anddecisions ofsuch foreign official, foreign political party, foreign political party official and foreign political candidate in his or heT official capacity; (b) inducing such foreign official,foreign political patty, foreign political party official and foreign political candidate to do and omit to do acts in violation ofthe lawful duty ofsuch official; (c) securing any improper advantage; and (d) inducing such foreign official, foreign political party, foreign political party official and foreign political candidate to use his or her influence with a foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such govermnent and agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist ODEBRECHT S.A. and itsemployees and agents in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business toODEBRECHT S.A. and others, contrary to Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-3.
77. In fu11herance ofthe conspiracy and to effect its objects, the defendant ODEBRECHT S.A. and at least one of the defendant' s co-conspirators committed and caused to be committed, within the Eastern District ofNew York and elsewhere, at least one of the following:
OVERT ACTS
a. In or about 2006, ODEBRECHT S.A., at the direction of Odebrecht
Employee 1, established a secret financial structure that was used by ODEBRECHT S.A. and itssubsidiaries, in part, to pay bribes to foreign officials, foreign political parties and foreign political candidates, as well as intermediaries on behalfof ODEBRECHT S.A. and several of itssubsidiaries.
b. On or about December 22, 2006, ODEBRECHT S.A . caused $10,935,066.85 to be transferred from one of the New York Accounts to the S&N Account.
c. On or about December 12, 2007, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two payments of$1 ,271 ,964.00 each, totaling $2,543,928.00, to be transferred from one ofthe New
YorkAccounts to the S&N Account.
d. On or about December 12, 2007, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two
p a y m e n t s o f $ 1 , 8 9 8 , 9 6 3 , 0 0 e a c h , t o t a l i n g $ 3 , 7 9 7, 9 6 2 . 0 0 , t o b e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o n e o f t h e N e wYork Accounts to the S&N Account.
e. On or about December 16, 2009, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused$6,583,828.14 to be transferred from one ofthe New York Accounts to the Arcadex Account.
f. On or about December 24, 2009, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $6,583,828.14 to be transferred from one of the New York Accounts to the Arcadex Account.
g. On or about December 24, 2009, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two transfersof$329,191.42 each, totaling $658,382.84, to be made from the Arcadex Account to the SecondArcadex Account.
h. On or about March 25, 2010, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $434,980.00 tobe transferred from the Second A rcadex Account to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 2, then an executive atPetrobras.
1. ln or about October 2010, ODEBRECHT S.A. directed more than $40million in bribes to be paid to certain Brazilian political parties from its Division ofStructuredOperations in order to secure a contract for the provision of various environmental and security certification services for Petrnbras abroad.
j. In or about and between 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT S.A. directedbribepayments ofmore than $20 million to be made to Brazilian Official 4, a high-level state elected official in Brazil, and other foreign officials, in order to ensw·e continued work on a transportation project.
k. rn or about 2011, ODEBRECHT S.A. directed bribe payments of approximately $9.7 million to be made to a political party designed by Brazilian Official 5, ahigh-Level official within the legislative branch of government in Brazil, in exchange for the party's influence in the continuation of a construction project in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
l. On or about May 23, 2011 , ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $1 ,000,000.00 to be transfe1Ted from the S&N Account to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 1, then an executive at Petrobras.
m. On or about June 6, 2011 , ODEBRECI:-IT S.A. caused $1,012,500.00 to be transferred from the S&N Account to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official l.
n. In or about and between December 2013 and late 2014, ODEBRECHTS.A. directed bribe payments ofapproximately $6 million to be made to a high-level official ofa Mexican state-owned and state-controlled company in exchange for the official assistingODEBRECHT with winning a project.
o. In or about 2015, Odebrecht Employee 4 attended a meeting in Miami,Florida with the agent o f a high-level government official in Antigua, and agreed to pay $4 million to the government official, if the government official refrained from providing banking.
Records revealing illicit payments made by the Division of Structured Operations to internationalauthorities.
(Title I8, United States Code, Sections 371 and 3551 ~ ~ . )
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UNITEDST A TESA TTORNEYEASTERN D1STR1CT OF NEW YORK
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