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Listado de países que recibió dólares en forma de sobornos por Constructora Norberto Odebrecht

¿Qué países han recibido sobornos de Odebrecht?

Nueva York, Estados Unidos.- El Departamento de Justicia de Los Estados Unidos, y según una sentencia del juzgado del distrito Este de New York publicó un listado de Países que recibió dólares en forma de sobornos.

En diciembre de 2016, la constructora Odebrecht pagó una multa récord de 3.500 millones de dólares al Departamento de Justicia de Estados Unidos y su director general, Marcelo Odebrecht, fue condenado a 19 años de cárcel en Brasil.

Descarga 29 paginas para descubrir que cantidades de dólares recibió cada país en forma de sobornos a altos funcionarios y empresarios.

Enlace debajo: Descarga listado completo: Clip en nombre.

WMP/DK:JN/AS F. #2016R00709
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT O f NEW YORK- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
ODEBRECHT S.A.,Defendant.
-------------------------------XTHE UNITED STATES CHARGES:
At all times relevant to thiInformation, unless otherwise stated:T. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977as amendedTitle 15United States Code, Sections 78dd-l, et seq. (the "FCPA"), was enacted by Congress for the purpose of, among other things, making it unlawful to act corruptly in furtherance of an offer, promise,authorization, or payment of money or anything of value, directly or indirectlyto a foreign official for the purpose of assisting in obtaining or retaining business for, or ditecting business toany person.11. Relevant Entities and Individuals
2. Defendant ODEBRECHT S.Awas a Brazilian holding company that,through various operating entities (collectively "ODEBRECHT"), conducted business inmultiplindustries, including engineering, constrnction, infrastn1ctureenergy, chemicals, utilities and real estate. ODEBRECHT S.A. had its headquarters in Salvador, state of Bahia,Braziland operated in 2other countries, including the United States.
I N F O R M A T I O NCr. No. 16-64(RJD)
(T. 18, U.S.C., §§ 371 and 3551 et~.)
3. Construtora Norberto Odebrecht ("CNO") was a Brazilian-basedsubsidiary of ODEBRECHT S.A. CNO was responsible focarrying out projects in Brazilrelated to transport and logisticsenergy, sanitationurban development and public and corporate construction. CNO housed unit called the Division of Structured Operationswhichas described below, was created to allow ODEBRECHT to make uncecorded payments, many ofwhich took the form of bribes to government officials in Brazil and abroad.
4Braskem S.A. ("Braskem"), sociedade anontrna (corporation) organizedunder the laws of Brazil and headquartered in Sao PauloBrazilwas one of the largestpetrochemical companies in the Americasproducing a portfolio of petrochemical and thermoplastic products. ODEBRECHT S.A. owned 50.1 1ofthe voting shares and 38.1ofthe total shal'e capital ofBrnskem and effectively controlled the companyPetr61eo BrasileiroS.A. Pet:robras ("Petrobras")Brazil's national oil companyowned 36.1% ofthe shares ofBraskem. American depositary shares ofBraskem traded on the New York Stock ExchangeandBraskem was required to file annual repo11s with the United States Securities and Exchange Comm ission (the "SEC"under Section 5(d) o f the Exchange ActTitle 15, United States Code,Section 78o(d). Braskem was an "issuer" as that term is used in the FCPATitle 15UnitedStates Code, Sections 78dd-l(a) and 78m(b).
5. Smith & Nash Engineering Company ("S&N'1) , an unaffiliated shell company based in the British Virgin Islandswas established and managed at the Division ofStructured Operations' direction. S&N waused by ODEBRECHT to fmther the briberyscheme, and to conceal and disguise improper payments made toand for the benefit of, foreignofficials and foreign political parties in various countries. S&N opened at least one offshore
bank account (the "S&N Account'') on behalfof ODEBRECHT. ODEBRECHT transferredmoney from various bank accountsincluding several New York-based bank accounts (the "NewYork-based Accounts")to the S&N Account. The funds in the S&N Account were then usedinpartto make direct and indirect bribe payments to foreigofficials. A United States citizen and resident ofNew York and Florida was the authorized signatory onthe S&N Account.
6Arcadex Corporation ("Arcadex") was an unaffiliated shell companyincorporated in Belize. Arcadex was established and managed at the Division of StructuredOperations, direction and used by ODEBRECHT to further the bribuy schemeand to conceal and disguise improper payments made toand fothe benefit of, foreign officials and foreignpoliticapatties in various countTies. Arcadex opened at least one offshore bank account (the "ArcadexAccount")onbehalfofODEBRECHT. ODEBRECHTtransferredmoneyfrom various bank accounts, including the New York-based Accounts, to the Arcadex Account. Thefunds in the Arcadex Account were then usedin partto make direct and indirect bribe paymentsto foreign officials.
7Golac Projects and Construction Corporation ("Golac") was an unaffiliated shell company incorporated jn thBritish Virgin Islands. Golac was established and managed at the Division of Structured Operations' direction and used by ODEBRECHT tofurther the bribery scheme, and to conceal and disguise co1rnpt payments made to, and for the benefit offoreign officials and foreign political parties in various countries. Golac opened atleast one offshore bank account (the "Golac Account") on behalf of ODEBRECHT.ODEBRECHTtransferred money from various bank accountsincluding the New York~based
Accounts, to the Golac Account. The funds in the Golac Account were then usedin part, to make direct and indirect bribe payments to foreign officials.
8. "Odebrecht Employee I," citizen of Brazil whose identity is known to the United States and ODEBRECHT, was an officer and senior executive of ODEBRECHT or about and between January 2009 and December 2015 and an officer and senior executive ofCNO in or about and between January 2002 and January 2010. Odebrecht Employee was also a director ofBraskem in or about and between 2009 and December 2015,
9. "Odebrecht Employee 2," a citizen ofBrazil whose idehtity is known tothe United States and ODEBRECHT, was a senior executive in the Division ofStructtrredOperationsin ot· about and between 2006 and 2015, and rep01ted directly to Odebrecht Employee 1. Odebrecht Employee 2 operated the Division of Structured Operations to account for and disburse payments that were not included in ODEBRECHT1s publicly-declaredfinancials, including corrupt payments made toor for the benefit of, foreign officials and foreignpolitical parties in order to obtain and retain business for ODEBRECHT.
I0. "Odebrecht Employee 3," a citizen of Brazil whose identity is known tothe United States and ODEBRECHT, was an executive of the Division of Structured Operations fromapproximately2006to2015. OdebrechtEmployee3reportedtoOdebrechtEmployee2 and was responsible for ovet'seeing corrupt payments made in Brazil and abroad. In or about 2014 and 2015, while located in Miami, Florida, Odebrecht E1uployee 3 engaged in criminal conduct in furtherance of the scheme, including meetings with other co-conspirators to planactions to be taken iconnection with the Division of Structured Operations and the movementof cdminal proceeds.
1J. "Odebrecht Einp.Joyee 4,a citizen ofBrazil whose identity is known to the United States and ODEBRECHT, was the Division of Structured Operations executive in charge offinancial operations for complex and large payments made by the Division of Structured Operations outside ofBrazil from approximately 2006 to 2015. Odebrecht Employee 4 also helped Odebrecht Employee 3 oversee the corrupt payments made by theDivisjon of Sti:uctured Operations in Brazil. In or about 2014 and 2015, w hillocated in Miami,Florida, Odebrecht Employee engaged in conduct in furtherance ofthe schemeincluding meetings with other co-conspirators to plan actions to be taken in connection with the Divisionof Structured Operations and the movement of criminal proceeds,
12. "Odebrecht Employee 5,a citizen of Brazil whose identity is known to the United States and ODEBRECHTwas a high-level executive of CNO from approximately
1997 to 2007. Thereafterfrom approximately 2008 to 2010OdebrechtEmployee 5 held an officeposition at CNO in the indush·iaworks area, and in or about 2011 Odebrecht Employee 5 became a Corporate Leader within CNO. He remained in that position until approximately 2015.As the primary contact between ODEBRECHT and Petrobras between approximately 2004 and 2012Odebrecht Employee 5 oversaw the negotiation and payment of bribes by ODEBRECHTto Pett·obras officials to obtain and retain business witPetrobras.
13. "Odebrecht Employee 6," a citizen of Brazil whose identity is known tothe United States and ODEBRECHT, was a high-leveJ executive of the international area ofthe engineeringdivisionofODEBRECHTfromapproximately2008to2015. Odebrecht Employee 6 reported to Odebrecht Employee l and was responsible for overseeingODEBRECHT's Superintendent Directorsor country leaders, of Angola and several Latin
American countries. As pa1t of that supervisionOdebrecht Employee 6 approved many of thecorrupt payments to foreign officials and foreign political parties outside ofBrazil.
14Petrobras was a Brazilian state-controlled oicompany, and a minorityshareholder in Braskem. Petrobras was headquat1ered in Rio de JaneiroBrazil, and operated to refine, produce and distribute oiloil products, gas, biofuels and energy. The Braziliangovernment directly owned approximately 50.3% ofPetrobras's common shares with vofa1grights, while an additional 10% ofthe corporation's shares were controlled by the Brazilian Development Bank and Brazil's Sovereign Wealth Ftmd. Petrobras was an "agency" and "instrumentality" ofa foreign governmentas those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15United States CodeSections 78dd-l (f)(l) and 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
15. ''Brazilian Official l," an individual whose identity is knowto the United States and ODEBRECHTwas an executive and director at Petrobras. Brazilian Official I was a"foreign official" within the meaning oftbe FCPA, Title 15United States CodeSection 78dd-3(t)(2)(A).
16. "Brazilian Official 2," an individual whose identity is known to the United StatesandODEBRECHT,wasanexecutiveanddirectoratPetrobras. BrazilianOfficial2wasa"foreign officialwithin the meaning ofthe FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd­ 3(f)(2)(A).
17. "Brazilian Official 3," an individual whose identity is known to the United States and ODEBRECHT, was a manager at Petrobras. Brazilian Official 3 was a "foreign officialwithin the meaning of the FCP ATitle 15United States Code, Section 78dd"3(t)(2)(A).
18. ''Brazilian Official 4," aindividual whose identify is known to the United States and ODEBRECHTwas a high-level state elected official in Brazil. Brazilian Official 4 was a "foreign official" within the meaning ofthe FCPATitle 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
19. "Brazilian Official 5," an individual whose identity is known to the United States and ODEBRECHT, was a high-leveofficial in the legislative branch of government in Brazil. Brazilian Official 5 was a "foreign official" within the meaning oftheFCPA, Title 15,United States Code, Section 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
IIL Overview 
o f the Bribery Scheme
20. In or about and between 2001 and 2016ODEBRECHTtogether with itsco-conspirators, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with others to corruptly provide hundreds ofmillions ofdollaripayments and other things ofvalue to, and for the benefitof, foreign officials, foreign political parties, foteign politicaparty officials and foreign political candidates to secure an improper advantage and to influence those foreign officialsforeignpolitical parties and foreign political candidates in order to obtain and retain business in various countries around the world.
During the relevant time period, ODEBRECHT, together with its co-conspirators, paid approximately $788 million in bribes in association with more than 100 projects in twelve countriesincluding A ngola, ArgentinaBrazilColombiaDominican RepublicEcuador, GuatemalaMexico, Mozambique, PanamaPeru and Venezuela.
22To fmther the criminal bribery schemeODEBRECHT and itco- conspirators created and funded an. elaborate, secret financial structure that operated to account
for and disburse corrupt bribe payments to, and for the benefit offoreign officials, foreignpolitical partiesforeign political party officials and foreign political candidates. Overtimethe development and operation of this secret financial structure evolved, and in or about 2006,ODEBRECHT established the Division of Structured Operationsa standalone division within ODEBRECHT. The Division of Structured Operations effectively functioned as a bribedepartment within ODEBRECHT and its telated entities. To conceal its activities, the DivisionofStructured Operations utilized an entirely separate and off-book communications system
called "Drousys," which allowed members ofthe Division of Structured Operations to communicate with one another and with outside financial operators and other co-conspirators about the bribes through the use of secure emails and instant messagesutilizing codenames and passwords.
23ODEBRECHT and its employees and agents took a number ofsteps whilein the territory of the United States in furtherance of the corrupt scheme. For example, some ofthe offshore entities used by the Division o f Structtll'ed Operations to hold and disburseunrecorded funds were establishedowned and/or operated by individuals located in the United States. In additionat times during the conspiracy, individuals working in the Division ofStructured Operations, including Odebrecht Employee 3, Odebrecht Employee 4 and others, took steps in furtherance of the bribery scheme while located in the United States. For examplein or about 20 l4 and 2015, while located in Miami, FloridaOdebrecht Employee 3 and OdebrechtEmployee 4 engaged in conduct t·elated to certain projects in furtherance ofthe scheme,including meetingwith other co-conspirators to plan actions to be taken in connection with the
Division ofStructured Operations, the movement of criminal proceeds and other criminalconduct.
24. In all, ODEBRECHT, together with its co-conspirators, paid more than$788 million in bribes to illegally secure projects in multiple cout1tries - including, as describedbelowcorrupt payments to Petrobras employees and executives; corrupt payments to othergovernment officials in Brazil; and corrupt payments to foreign officials in eleven other countries with ill-gotten benefits to ODEBRECHT and its co-conspirators of approximately $3.336 billion. In thls Information, " benefits'refer to any profits earned on a pruticular projectforwhichaprofitwasgeneratedastheresultofabribepayment. Forprojectsthatresultedin profits to ODEBRECHT that were less than the amount of the associated bribe paymentthe amount ofthe bribe payment was used to calculate the benefit.IVThe Division of Structured Operations and The Manneand Means of the Conspiracy
25. The Division of Structured Operations was led by Odebrecht Employee 2anstaffed by otheODEBRECHT employees and/or agents (including Odebrecht Employee 3 and Odebrecht Employee 4) who worked with a series of financial operators or doleiros (also known as money traders, who functioned to exchange Brazilian Reais for American dollars). Odebrecht Employee 2 reported to Odebrecht Employee Jwho was responsible for approving corrupt payments made by the Division of Structured Operationuntiapproximately 2009and whothereafter, received updates of the payments made by the Division of StructuredOperationsAfter approximately 2009, Odebrecht Employee l delegated the responsibility forapproving the cmrnpl payments to the business leaders in Brazil and the various country leaders in the other jurisdictions.
26. The Division of Structured Operations managed its "shadow" budget via two computer systems: (i) the "MyWebDay'' system, which was used for making payment tequests, processing paymentsand generating and populating spreadsheets that tracked andinternally accounted for the shadow budget; and (ii) the "Drousyssystem, which allowed members ofthe Division of Structured Operations to communicate with one another and with outside financial operators and other co-conspirators using secure emails and instant messages.
To conceal their corrupt activities, users ofthe Drousys system utilized a series ofcodenames tomask their identities, and referred to bribe recipients and intermediaries using additional codes and passwords.
27. To further conceal ODEBRECHT's criminal conduct, the Division ofStructured Operations managed and distTibuted funds that ODEBRECHT never recorded on itsbalance sheet. These ''lmrecorded funds" were generated by ODEBRECHT through a variety ofmethods, including but not limited to: (i) standing overhead charges collected from subsidiaries;(ii) overcharges and fees that were attributed as legitimate to service providers and subcontractors but not included in project budgets; (iii) undeclared retainers and success fees forthe purchase of company assetsand (iv) self-insurance and self-guarantee transactions.
28. Once generated, w1recorded funds were funneled by the Division ofStructured Operations to a series of offshore entities that were not included on ODEBRECHT's balance sheet as related entities. These entities were established and managed at the Division ofStructured Operationsdirection by beneficial owners who were compensated for opening and,in some cases, operating these entities. ODEBRECHT used these offshore entities to further the bribery scheme, and to conceal and disguise improper payments made to, or for the benefit of,
foreign officials, foreign politicapartiesforeign political party officials and foreign political candidates in various countries. Many ofthe transactions were layered through multiple levelsofoffshore entities and bank accounts throughout the worldoften transferrinthe illicit fundsthrough up to four levels of offshore bank accotmtbefore reaching the final recipient. In thisregardmembers ofthe conspiracy sought to distance the origin ofthe funds from the final beneficiaries.
29The funds werdisbursed from the offshore entities at the Division of Structmed Operationsdirection. These disbursements were made by financial operators who acted on ODEBRECHT's behalfincluding but not limited to the beneficial owners of theaccow1ts and doleiroswho delivered the payments in cash both inside and outside Brazil inpackages or suitcases at locations predetermined by the beneficiary ofthe funds; or made the payments via wire transfer tlU'ough one or more ofthe offshore entities.
30. 1nfl.utherance ofthe bribery scheme and to facilitate the movement of illicit funds, ODEBRECHT and its co-conspirators also utilized banks with distinct features thatwould aid in the scheme: specificallysmaller banks located in countries witstrict lawsregarding the protection of bank secrecy and the sharing of information with international law enforcement. To ensurthe cooperation ofthese favored banks, ODEBRECHT and its co­ conspirators frequently paid remuneration fees and higher rates to the banking institutions, and a percentageofeachillicittransactiontocertaincomplicitbankexecutives. TheDivisionof Structured Operations counted on the collusion ofthe favored banks and their executives toconduct the tt·ansfers between accountslargely relying on the use of fictitious contracts to backstop the transactions and bypass compliance inquiries. Ce11ain co-conspiratorssuch as
Odebrecht Employee 4, visited the countries where the final beneficiaries were located andbrought them to the favored banks to open accounts to facilitate the illicit payment transfers.
31. After a particular favored bank located in Antigua began to falter, members ofthe conspiracy, including formeexecutives with the faltering bank, purchased theAntiguan branch of an Austrian bank in or about 2010 or 201 I. By virtue of this acquisition, other members of the conspfracy, including senior politicians fromultiple countries receivingbribe payments, could open bank accounts and receive transfers without the risk ofraising attentionBy acquiring the bank, members ofthe conspiracyincluding Odebrecht Employee 4andothers,wiUfullyfacilitatedtheillegalpaymentscheme. Theyalsoactivelyparticipatedinobtaining fictitious contracts to suppmtthe operationofthe DivisionofStructured Operationsanresponded directlto compliance issues in order to allow operations to be attthorized.
32. ODEBRECHT caused wfre transfers to be made to these and other bankaccounts created by these offshore entities from ODEBRECHT-related bank accountsincluding from severalNew York-based Accounts held by CNO.V. Corrupt Payments to Government Officials in Brazil
33Beginning in at least as early as 2003 and continuing throughapproximately 2016, ODEBRECHT caused approximately $349 million in corrupt bribe payments to be made to political pattiesforeigofficials, and their representatives, in Brazilinorder to secure aimproper advantage to obtain anretain business for ODEBRECHT.ODEBRECHT benefited mot'e than$] .9 billion as a result of these corrupt payments.
A. Corrupt Payments to Obtain and Retain Business with Petrobras34. Beginninin or about 2004 and continuinthrough at least 2012,
ODEBRECHT agreed to makeand caused to be made, corrupt payments toand for the benefitof, foreign officials, including Brazilian politicians and Petrobras executives and employees, inorder to secure contracts with Petrobras.
3 5 . A s p a t t o f t h e s c h e m e O D E B R E C H T p a 1t i c i p a t e d i n a s e r i e s o f e e t i n g s with other construction companies to evaluate and divide up future contracts for Petrobrasprojects among the companies (together, the "Cartel Companies"). Once it was determinedwhiccompany or companies should be responsible for a certaiproject, as well as the price thatPetrobras felt was appropriate for the particular project, it was agreed that only the predete1mined company would present qualifying bidand that the other CarteCompanies would present proposals that would ensmthe predete1mined company's wi1ming bid. In thismannerthe Cartel Companies rotated the availablPetrobras contracts between them.
36. Ceitain executives of Petrobras involved iawarding the projects onbehalfofPetrobras were aware ofthe CarteCompanies' bid riggingand in orderto guaranteethe continued success of the birigging scheme and to secure the contracts with Petrobras,ODEBRECHT and the other CaiteCompanies agreed to make corrupt payments toand for the benefit of, these Petrobrns executives, other Brazilian politicians and politicaparties.
37. For example, in oabout October 20 I0ODEBRECHT bid foand won aPetrobras contract for thprovisioh ofvarious environmentaand security certification setvicesthatwerenecessaryforvariousactivitiesthatPetrobrasunde1tookabroad. lnordertowinthecontract, ODEBRECHT agreed tpay bribes that would be forwarded to Brazilian political
parties. OdebrechtEmployee 5 metwith certain ofthe Cartel Companies, all ofwhich agreed that ODEB.RECHT would get the contract; two ofthe CarteCompanies also agreed to provide proposals in such a way that would ensure that ODEBRECHT would win the bid.ODEBRECHT directed more than $40 million to ce1tain Brazilian political paities from its Division of Structured Operations using unrecorded funds in connection with the project; andce1tain of the funds were paid directly to specific goverrunent officials.
38. ODEBRECHT caused numerous illicit payments to be made from UnitedStates-based bank accounts to perpetuate its bribe scheme in Brazil. For example, between atleast December 2006 and December 2007, ODEBRECHT caused transfers totaling almost $40millionto be made frotn the New York-based Accounts to the S&N Account. Thereafter, in orbetween January and August 2011, ODEBRECHT used the S&N AccoL1nt to make bribepaymentsincluding paying approximately $3.5 million and almost 2 million Swiss Francs to thebank account of an offshore entity controlled by Brazilian Official 1, then an executive atPetrobras.
39. Similarlyin or about December 2009, ODEBRECHT caused transferstotaling approximately $20 million to be made from the New York-based Accounts to theArcadex AccOLmt. Before and contemporaneously with the trnnsfers from the New York-based Accounts, ODEBRECHT caused numerous money transfers to be made from the Arcadex Account to a second Arcadex account (the "Second Arcadex Account'') that was used to make bribe paymentsincluding an approximately $430,000 bribe payment to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 2, then an executive at Petrobras.
40. Furthermorein or about December 2008ODEBRECHT caused transfers totaling almost $48 million to be made from the New York-based Accounts to the Golac AccOLmt. Thereafter,inotaboutandbetweenDecember2008andJuly2010,ODEBRECHTcaused transfers from the Golac Account to three unrelated accounts in Panama and Antigua from which approximately $10 million was transferred to the accounts of three then-Petrobras executives Brnzilian Official 1, Brazilian Official 2 and Brazilian Official 3.
B. Corrupt Payments to Obtain and Retain Other Business in Brazil41. ln addition to the corrupt payments to secure contracts wW1. Petrobras, ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made corrupt payments to political parties, individual
candidates and other government officials at the localregional and national level in Brazil with unrecorded funds from the Division of Structured Operations in order to obtain and retain other business in Brazil.
42. For exampleODEBRECHT made and caused to be made coi:rupt payments to Brazilian officials with unrecorded funds in order to secure a transp01tation project in Brazil. ODEBRECHT was not prut ofthe original group of companies awarded the project,but ultimately purchased the rights to participate in the project. SubsequentlyODEBRECHT agreed to make payments to Brazilian Official 4, a high-level state elected official in Brazilinexchange for Brazilian O:ffidal 4's assistance in enstu'ing ODEBRECHT's continued work on the project. Between approximately 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHTthrough the Division of Structured Operationsmade payments in Brazilian Reais (totaling more than $20 million) to Brazilian Offilcial 4 and other foreign officials in connection with the project. ODEBRECHTprofited approximately $184 million from the project.
43. Similarly, in or about 2011, Brazilian Official 5, a high-level officialwithin the legislative branch of government in Brazil, requested that ODEBRECHT make payments to political party in exchange for the pa1ty's influence to continue constructionproject in Rio de Janeiro from which ODEBRECHT stood to benefit. In or about and between2011 and 2014ODEBRECHTthrough the Division ofStructured Operationsmade payments in Brazilian Reais (totaling approximately $9.7 million) to Brazilian Official 5,_ as did othercompanies involved in the project, in order to ensurfuture contributions to the project fromcertain government groups. ODEBRECHT profited approximately $142 million from theproject.
Corrupt Payments to Foreign Officials and Political Parties in Other Countries
44. In or about and between 2001 and 2016, ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made approximately $439 million in corrupt payments to foreign political pattiesforeignofficials, and their representativesin countries outside of Brazil, including Angola, Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, MozambiquePanamaPeruand Venezuelain order to secure aimproper advantage to obtain and retain business forODEBRECHTinthosecountries. ODEBRECHTbenefitedmorethan$1.4billionasaresultofthese corrupt payments.
45. ODEBRECHT made and caused to be made the majority ofthese corruptpayments to government officials; third parties associated with, and for the benefit of, government officials; and political parties or campaigns. All ofthe corrupt payments were madeto secme an improper advantage for ODEBRECHT to obtain and retain busjness. TypicallytheDivision of Structured Operations executed thcorrupt payments using unrecorded funds, either
(i) jn cash jn the country in question, or (ii) by deposits into accounts indicated by the ultimate beneficiaries or their intermediaries.
46. In or about and between 2008 and 2015, ODEBRECHT's corporate structme in Latin America was organized such that the senior-most country leaders reported to Odebrecht Employee 6, who was the.Business Leader for Angola (until July 2012, at which time,due to a restructuringOdebrecht Employee no longer had oversight io Angola) and the above­ referenced countries in Latin Americaexcept Venezuela.
A. Angola
fn or about and between 2006 and 2013ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $50 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Angola in order to secure public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits of approximately $261.7million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
48. for example, beginning in or about 2006, Odebrecht Employee 6 causedODEBRECHT to make approximately $8 million in corrupt payments to an Angolan government official to obtain infrastructure projects in Angola. ODEBRECHT also paid another approximately $1.19 million to a high-level official ofan Angolan state-owned and state­ controlled company to obtain business. The bribe payments were generally made with unrecorded funds and coordinated through the Division of Stn1ctured Operations.
B. Argentina
In or about and between 2007 and 2014ODEBRECHmade and caused
to be made more than $35 million in corrupt payments to intermediaries with the understandingthat these payments would be passed, in part, to government officials in Argentina. The corrupt
payments were made in association with at least three infrastrncture projectsand ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofapproximately $278 million.
50. For examplein 2008, prior to a bid on government projects beingfinalizedODEBRECHT agreed thatin order to secure the contracts, ODEBRECHT and otherswould commito making a future payment to undisclosed government officials in Argentina inan unspecified amount. In or about and between 2011 and 2014, ODEBRECHT, through theDivision of Structured Operations, made payments totaling approximately $2.9 million to an intermediary with the understanding that the intermediary would pass the payments toArgentinian government officials.
I. Thereafter, in or about and between January 2011 and March 20 I4,ODEBRECHT made additional corrupt payments through the Division of Structured Operations totaling approximately $500,000 to private accounts at the direction of an intermediarywith theunderstanding that the payments were for the benefit ofArgentinian government officials.
C. Colombia
In or about and between 2009 and 2014ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be madmore tha$11 million in corrupt payments in Colombia in order to secUJ·e public workscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$50millionasaresultofthese corruppayments.
53. For examplein or about and between 2009 and 2010, ODEBRECHTagreed to payand later paid through the Division of Structured Operations with OdebrechtEmployee 6s authorization, a $6.5 million bribe to a government official in charge o f awarding
a construction project with the Colombian government in exchange for assistance with winning the project.
D. The Dominican Republic54. fn or about and between 200 and 20 4, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $92 million in corrupt payments to government officials and intermediariesworkingontheirbehalfintheDominicanRepublic. ODEBRECHTrealized benefits of more than $163 million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
55. For example, in order to secure certain public works contracts in theDominican Republic, ODE.BRECHT paid bribes to an intermediary responsible for interfacingwith the govenunent with the understanding that the inte11nediary would pass the money, in part,to government officials. Most ofthe payments were made with unrecorded funds from theDivision of Structured Operations with the authorization of Odebrecht Employee 6Through this agreement, ODEBRECHT was able to influence governmental budget and financing approvals for ce1tain projects in the Dominican Republic.
E. Ecuador
In or about and between 2007 and 2016, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $33.5 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Ecuador. ODEBRECHT realized benefits of more than $116 million as a result of these corrupt payments.
57. For examplein or about and between 2007 and 2008ODEBRECHT experienceda nwnber of problems related to a construction contract, and agreed with an intermediary to an Ecuadorian government official with control over public contracts to make
corn.1pt payments to the govermuent official to solve the problems. ODEBRECHT later delivered these payments in cash to the government official.
F. Guatemala
In or about and between 2013 and 2015, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $18 million in co1rnpt payments to government officials in Guatemalainordertosecurepublicworkscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$34million as a result ofthese corrupt payments.
59. For example, in relation to an infrastructut'e project awatded to ODEBRECHT, the company agreed to pay high-ranking Guatemalan government official apercentage of the value ofthe contract over the life ofthe project in exchange for the official assisting ODEB.RECHT with obtajning payments under the contract. ODEBRECHT madeapproximately $11.5 million in corrupt payments, through the Division of Structured Operationsand with Odebrecht Employee 6's approval, to companies designated by the Guatemalan official.
G. Mexrco
In or about and between 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $10.million in corrupt payments to government officials in Mexico in order to secut'e public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofmore than $39mj[Jion as a t'esult o f these corrupt payments.
61. For example, in or about October 2013, ODEBRECHT agreed to pay a bribe to a high-leveofficial ofMexican state-owned and state-controlled company in exchange fortheofficialassistingODEBRECHTwithwinningaproject. Inoraboutandbetween
December 2013 and late 2014, ODEBRECHTthrough the Divjsion of Structw·ed Operations,paid the official $6 mWion.
H. Mozambique62. In or about and between 201 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximately $900,000 in corrupt payments to government officials inMozambique.
63. The corrupt payments included approximately $250,000 in paymentto ahigh-level government official in Mozambique in exchange for ODEBRECHT obtaining favorable te1ms on a government construction project, which the government had not beeninclined to accept before ODEBRECHT offered to make the corrupt payment. ODEBRECHT made these payments in installments of$135,000 and $115,000 with the Division of StructuredOperations' unrecorded funds from an offshore company.
I. Panama64. In or about and between 2010 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made more than $59 million in corrupt payments to government officials and intermediaries working on their behalf ih Panama in order to secure, among other thingspublicworkscontracts. ODEBRECHTrealizedbenefitsofmorethan$175millionasaresultofthese corrupt payments.
65. For example, in or about and between 2009 and 2012ODEBRECHTagreed to pay $6 miJlion to two close relatives ofhigh-level Panamanian government official inconnection with government infrastructLu-e projects, with the understanding that, in exchange for the paymentsthe government officiawould ensure ODEBRECHT's participation in and
paymentunderthecontracts. 1nordertoeffectuatethecon:uptpayments,ODEBRECHTutilized the Division of Structmed Operations to make payments in umecorde<l funds to offshore companies designated by the Panamanian government officiaand intermediaries.
J. Peru
In oabout and between 2005 and 2014, ODEBRECHT made and caused
to be made approximatel$29 million in corrupt payments to government officials in Pe1:in order to secure public works contracts. ODEBRECHT realized benefits ofmore than $143million as resulofthese corrupt payments.
67. For example, in or about 2005, ODEBRECHT participated in a tender fora government infrastructure project. During the tender process, an ODEBRECHT employee wasapproacheban intermediary ofhigh-level official in the Peruvian governmentwho offered to suppo,t ODEBRECHT's bid, if, in the event that ODEBRECHT was awarded thprojectit would make corrupt paymentbenefiting the government official. The payments were agreed to be paid through companies owned by an intennediary whhad a relationship with the government official. Aftethinitial conversations with the intermediary, the ODEBRECHTemployee pa1ticipated in several meetings, some of whicwere attended by the governmentofficial. ODEBRECHT won the tendeand made co1rnpt payments totaling approximately $20 miUion from approximately 2005 to 2008 to specific companies, as directed by the intermediary,with unrecorded fundfrom the Division of Structured Operations.
68. Fwihermorein or about 2008, ODEBRECHT bid oa government transportation contract iPeru. In order to influence thbid committee to help ODEBRECHTsecure the contractODEBRECHT agteed to pay $1.4 million to a high-leveofficial in the
Peruvian government and members ofthe tender committee for the project. In or about 2009,ODEBRECHT won the contract, valued at approximatel$400 millionODEBRECHT made the corrupt payments, which were approved by Odebrecht Employee 6with unrecorded fuhdsfrom the Division of Structured Operations.
K. V enezuela69. In or about and between 2006 and 2015, ODEBRECHmade and caused
to be made approximately $98 million icorrupt payments to government officials and intermediaries working on their behalf in Venezuela in order to obtain and retain public works contracts.
70. ODEBRECHT typically used intermediaries to negotiate contracts withgovernment officials on behalf othe company. ODEBRECHT understood that theseintermediaries would pay bribes to government officials on behalfofthe company in order to influence the allocation of resources to ODEBRECHT projects, to obtain confidentiapricingand bidding information in connection with those projectsand to obtain and retain contracts for those projects. Generally, these intennediaries charged a percentage ofthe contract price inconnection with their work on behalf of ODEBRECHT.
71. For exampleODEBRECHT paid an intermediary to help it obtain contracts with a Venezuelan state-owned and state-controlled company. During the negotiations;the intermediaiy made it cleathat the money would be used to pay a bribe in exchange for obtaining cettain service agreements and amendmentsand that the intermediary represented various directors ofthe state-owned and state-controlled companyODEBRECHpaid the intermediary approximately $39 million.
VII. Obstruction of Justice72. ln or about 2014, Brazilian law enforcement authorities began an initially
covert investigation into corrnption related to Petrobras, called Lavo Jato ot' "OperationCarwash." Thereafterrelated investigationwere launched in the United States and Switzerland. After ODEBRECHT became aware of Lavo Jato and related investigationscetiainindividuals - including Odebrecht Employee 1 and employees anexecutives involved in theDivision of Strucl:tn'ed Operations - took steps to conceal or destroy evidence of criminal activitiesand to hinder the various investigations. These steps includedbut were not limited to,directive from Odebrecht Employee 1 to ODEBRECHT employees to delete records that mightreveal illegaactivities.
73. Furthermorein or about mid-2015, Odebrecht Employee 4 attended ameeting in Miami, Florida, with a consular official from Antigua and an intermediary to a high­level government official in Antigua. In order to conceal ODEBRECHT's corrupt activities,Odebrecht Employee requested that the high-level official refrain from providing to international authorities various banking documents that would reveal illicit payments made bythe Division of StructUl'ed Operations on behalf of ODEBRECHTand agreed to pay $4 million tthe high-level officiato refrain from sending the documents. Odebrecht Employee 3 made three payments of 1 million Euros on behalf of0DEBRECHT in ordet- to secure the deal. Thecontemplated fourth payment was never made.
74. Fmthermore, in or about January 2016, after Lavo Jato and theinvestigations by United States and Swiss authorities were well-known to ODEBRECHT;employees and/or agents of ODEBRECHT intentionally caused the destruction of phys.ical
encryptiokeys needed to access the MyWebDay systemwhich contained evidence relating tothe bribery schemeAs a result ofthese actions, significant evidence from the MyWebDaysystem was rendered inaccessible.
The allegationcontained in paragraphs one through 74 are realleged and
ittcorporated as though fully set fo1th in this paragraph.76. In or about and between 2001 and 2016both datebeing approximate and
inclusive, within the Eastern District ofNew Y ork and elsewherethe defendanODEBRECHTS.A.together with othersdid knowingly and willfully conspire to commit offenses against the United States, to wit: as a person other than an issuer or domestic concernthrough its employeesand agents, whilin the territory ofthUnited Statesdid corruptly commit acts in furtherance ofaofferpaymentpromise to pay, and authorization othe payment ofany moneyoffergift,promise to giveand authorizatioof the giving of anything of value to foreign officiala foreign political partya foreign political party officiala foreign political candidate and to a person, while knowing that all or a po1tion ofsuch money and thing ofvalue would be and had been offered, givenand promised to a foreign officiala foreign political prutya foreignpolitical party officiaand a foreign politicacandidate for purposes of: (a) influencing acts anddecisions ofsuch foreign officialforeign politicapartyforeign political party officiaand foreigpolitical candidate in his oheT official capacity(b) inducing such foreign official,foreign politicapatty, foreign political party officiaand foreign politicacandidate to do and omito do acts in violation ofthe lawful duty ofsuch official(c) securing any improper advantageand (d) inducing such foreign officialforeign political party, foreign political party
official and foreign political candidate to use his or her influence with a foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such govermnent and agencies and instrumentalitiesin order to assist ODEBRECHT S.A. and itsemployees and agents in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business toODEBRECHT S.Aand otherscontrary to Title 15United States Code, Section 78dd-3.
77. In fu11herance ofthe conspiracy and to effect its objects, the defendant ODEBRECHT S.A. and at least one of the defendants co-conspirators committed and caused to be committedwithin the Eastern District ofNew York and elsewhereat least one of the following:
In or about 2006ODEBRECHT S.A., at the direction of Odebrecht
Employee 1established secret financial structure that was used by ODEBRECHT S.A. and itssubsidiariesin partto pay bribes to foreign officialsforeign political parties and foreign political candidates, as well as intermediaries on behalfof ODEBRECHT S.A. and several of itssubsidiaries.
b. On or about December 22, 2006, ODEBRECHT S.A caused $10,935,066.85 to be transferred from one of the New York Accounts to the S&N Account.
c. On or about December 122007, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two payments of$1 ,271 ,964.00 eachtotaling $2,543,928.00to be transferred from one ofthe New
YorkAccountto the S&N Account.
d. On or about December 122007ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two
p a y m e n t s 
o f $ 1 , 8 9 8 , 9 6 3 0 0 e a c h t o t a l i n g $ 3 7 9 79 6 2 0 0 t o b e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m o n e o f t h e N e wYork Accounts to the S&N Account.
e. On or about December 16, 2009ODEBRECHT S.A. caused$6,583,828.14 to be transferred from one ofthe New York Accounts to the Arcadex Account.
f. On or about December 242009ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $6,583,828.14 to be transferred from one of the New York Accounts to the Arcadex Account.
g. On or about December 242009ODEBRECHT S.A. caused two transfersof$329,191.42 each, totaling $658,382.84, to be made from the Arcadex Account to the SecondArcadex Account.
h. On or about March 252010, ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $434,980.00 tobe transferred from the Second A rcadex Accounto bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 2then an executive atPetrobras.
1. lor about October 2010ODEBRECHT S.Adirected more than $40million in bribes to be paid to certain Brazilian political parties from its Division ofStructuredOperations in order to secure a contract for the provision of various environmental and security certification services foPetrnbras abroad.
j. In or about and between 2010 and 2014ODEBRECHT S.A. directedbribepayments ofmore than $20 million to be made to Brazilian Official 4a high-level state elected official in Braziland other foreign officialsin order to ensw·e continued work on a transportation project.
k. ror about 2011, ODEBRECHT S.A. directed bribe payments of approximately $9.7 million to be made to a political party designed by Brazilian Official 5ahigh-Level official within the legislative branch of government in Brazil, in exchange for the party's influence in the continuation of a construction project in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
l. On or about May 232011 ODEBRECHT S.A. caused $1 ,000,000.00 to be transfe1Ted from the S&N Account to a bank account controlled by Brazilian Official 1then aexecutive at Petrobras.
m. On or about June 62011 ODEBRECI:-IT S.A. caused $1,012,500.00 to be transferred from the S&N Account to bank account controlled by Brazilian Official l.
n. In or about and between December 2013 and late 2014ODEBRECHTS.A. directed bribe payments ofapproximately $6 million to be made to a high-level official ofa Mexican state-owned and state-controlled company in exchange for the official assistingODEBRECHT with winning a project.
oIn or about 2015Odebrecht Employee 4 attended a meeting in Miami,Florida with the agent o f high-level government official in Antiguaand agreed to pay $4 million to the government officialithe government official refrained from providing banking
records revealing illicit payments made by the Division of Structured Operations to internationalauthorities.
(Title I8United States Code, Sections 371 and 3551 ~ . )
ROBER~ ---­